“Ukraine has legalized shooting draft officers” — this was the shocking claim that spread rapidly across Russian media in recent weeks.

Unsurprisingly for Russian sources of information, it was nowhere near the truth, and was instead designed to undermine Ukraine’s mobilization efforts, and spread chaos and fear among society.

As Ukraine faces the grueling demands of prolonged war, its mobilization system has become an especially sensitive topic — precisely the space where Russian disinformation thrives.

The story alleged that Ukraine’s Supreme Court had issued a ruling allowing citizens to shoot employees of Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCCs). Russian outlets like OK.ru declared it a “historic verdict.” Finally, they claimed, Ukrainians had the legal right to resist being “hunted” by their own military.

The claim was false. Fact-checkers at the StopFake project debunked it swiftly. No such ruling exists in Ukraine’s official court registry. The Supreme Court does not have the authority to legalize violence against military personnel.

The claim was not just a lie about the law — it was a story, crafted to present Ukraine not as a country defending itself, but as a regime turning against its people, where the main enemy is the government, not Russia.

“Mobilization during war is inevitable, but it’s also extremely sensitive,” Yulia Yurkova, co-creator of StopFake, told the Kyiv Independent.

“The enemy seeks to break not just the military’s morale, but the spirit of the population behind it. And the success of the armed forces depends directly on the mobilization process.”

“By April 2022, when Russia realized its blitzkrieg had failed, it switched to a long-term campaign of information exhaustion,” she said.

Half-truths about mobilization

It’s important to acknowledge that the mobilization process in Ukraine does face real challenges.

There are legitimate concerns — from isolated cases of misconduct by TCC staff to individuals evading service through bribery or falsified documents.

“These campaigns are effective because they’re rooted in half-truths,” Yurkova said.

“There are isolated incidents, and Russia presents them as a systemic problem, launching a multi‑channel disinformation campaign.”

The line between fact and disinformation becomes blurred when isolated cases are generalized, exaggerated, or taken out of context.

“Criticism of a specific incident is normal in a free society. But when a single episode is presented as proof that ‘the entire system is criminal,’ it is very likely already part of a hostile information attack,” Yurkova said.

Volunteers attend a conscription point to sign contracts with the Ukrainian army in Ukraine on March 26, 2024. (Serhii Mykhalchuk / Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

Ukraine, as a democratic society, needs to talk openly about its problems. If not, the silence creates a gap — and disinformation will quickly fill it, Yurkova warns.

The false Supreme Court ruling wasn’t an isolated case and is part of a broader campaign targeting both Ukrainian and international audiences.

To reinforce such messaging, these operations rely heavily on visual and emotional manipulation — now easily generated with AI.

Escalation into real-world violence

“Social media narratives paint Ukrainian mobilization as increasingly coercive, highlighting forced conscription and public resistance,” a disinformation monitoring team at the LetsData company told the Kyiv Independent.

According to the analysts, two of the most common disinformation tactics are fear and dehumanization. Mobilization is portrayed as a violent, lawless process, with the Ukrainian state depicted as a threat to its own people.

“Mobilization turns into a form of violence. Individuals are portrayed as mere resources to be exploited rather than citizens with rights,” LetsData said.

Disinformation created a discursive environment that led to physical aggression.

Pseudo-legal activists merged with populist bloggers, and the messaging grew bolder, Yurkova said. Together, they began actively encouraging actions aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian state.

“The most notorious example is Ostap Stakhiv, who coordinated a large network of followers and spread disinformation about the so-called ‘illegality’ of mobilization and the ‘unconstitutionality’ of martial law,” she explained.

Eventually, the campaign evolved into a dangerous, coordinated effort with direct consequences on the ground.

"This disinformation created a discursive environment that led to physical aggression,"Yurkova said, referring to an incident in the western Ukrainian village of Kosmach in February 2024 when false rumors allegedly spread by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) led to an outbreak of rioting and violence.

“And since then, we’ve seen many others,” Yurkova added.

Mobilization in a long war

For all the noise surrounding mobilization, the core truth remains simple: Ukraine cannot survive this war without it, meaning it will likely remain a target for Russian disinformation for the foreseeable future.

“The enemy outnumbers us many times over. We’re fighting a war of endurance. Mobilization is inevitable,” Vitalii Sarantsev, a former communication officer for the military, told the Kyiv Independent.

Mobilization remains the most effective way to replenish the Armed Forces.

“It brings in the largest number of people eligible for military service. So far, it remains the most productive way to strengthen the army,” he said.

But the process itself and the expectations around it are not always clear to the public, which can create the perfect conditions in which Russian disinformation thrives.

Members of the Kharkiv Regional Recruitment Office (TCC) check a civilian’s documents while patrolling a key location in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Aug. 8, 2024. (Narciso Contreras / Anadolu via Getty Images)

Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCCs) are formally tasked with processing individuals who arrive either voluntarily or are brought in by local authorities or employers.

“The task of the TCC is to register a person, process them, and send them either to a training unit or directly to a military unit,” Sarantsev explained.

However, gaps in the system shift the burden.

“Unfortunately, there are failures — from certain officials and from local authorities. So the TCCs may be forced to carry out the entire process on their own.”

Another key issue is the lack of a defined term of service for conscripted soldiers.

In recent years, Ukraine has established recruitment centers where individuals can choose their preferred unit, match their service to their skills or education, and take a more active role in how they serve. But many hesitate to do so — largely because of uncertainty.

Currently, there is no fixed term for those drafted into the Armed Forces; Ukraine simply cannot afford to demobilize its soldiers. Therefore, once a person is mobilized, they serve until the end of the war. This indefinite commitment is one of the most psychologically difficult aspects of military service.

But as the war drags on, and the rules and the rewards are shifting.

In February 2025, the Ukrainian government introduced a new model of voluntary military service, known as ‘Contract 18-24’, to attract young people, offering a 1 million UAH bonus (approximately $25,000) and other benefits. However, those who joined earlier did not receive any of these perks.

“These are the realities of a long war. Ukraine needs to update legislation, introduce new contract types, create better motivation systems — these are the challenges our society faces now,” Sarantsev said.

Editor’s note: This article was published as part of the Fighting Against Conspiracy and Trolls (FACT) project, an independent, non-partisan hub launched in mid-2025 under the umbrella of the EU Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). Click here to follow the latest stories from our hub on disinformation.

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