Photo by Frederic Köberl

Europe is entering a moment of renewed strategic doubt. Conversations about security that once seemed theoretical have taken on a sharper edge as uncertainty grows about America’s long-term role, the direction of the war in Ukraine, and the resilience of Europe’s own defense capabilities. Leaders say that they recognize the need for greater self-reliance, yet their response remains uneven. The result is a widening gap between intention and action at a time when the international security environment is becoming more fragile.

The latest test came during the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels on December 3. European officials gathered amid ongoing concerns over sustained support for Ukraine and hybrid threats from Russia. The meeting reaffirmed priorities including boosting defense production and aid to Kyiv, while underscoring the commitment made earlier at the Hague Summit to a credible path toward 5 percent of GDP in defense and security-related spending by 2035, which is far beyond the old 2 percent target.

Ukraine’s position has become more challenging. Intense fighting continues near the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad axis, with Russian infiltration attempts and pressure on the front lines reinforcing Kyiv’s message that it needs more air-defense systems before winter further restricts mobility. Ukrainian commanders deny Russian claims of full capture or encirclement, but acknowledge the heightened intensity. Germany’s contributions, including additional Patriot systems in 2025, have been welcomed, but they also highlight Europe’s limited overall capacity. Ammunition and spare parts production continues to lag behind Ukrainian requirements. Efforts to expand manufacturing across the continent are underway, yet the pace remains slower than the situation demands.

The Czech-led initiative to source ammunition from outside Europe—a flagship effort under the previous government that has delivered around 1.8 million rounds in 2025 alone—has produced significant results, but its future is now uncertain following the formation of a new populist-led government under Andrej Babiš in mid-December. The new administration has pledged to cut direct Czech funding for Ukraine aid, criticized the program’s transparency, and signaled a potential withdrawal or scaling back of Prague’s coordinating role, with a key security council decision pending in early January 2026. This shift risks disrupting a critical supply line that accounts for a substantial portion of Ukraine’s artillery ammunition and underscores growing divergences in European commitment to Kyiv.

France, Italy, the Baltic states, and several Nordic governments have urged the EU to adopt more coordinated procurement policies. These proposals face financial resistance from member states dealing with slower growth and rising social spending. Even governments that back deeper integration struggle to build the domestic consensus needed for sustained investment. The EU’s SAFE defense plan reached a milestone around early December, with 19 states submitting joint procurement strategies and Canada joining as a partner. But earlier divisions, such as the rejection of the Dutch parliament in March 2025 of the broader €800 billion ReArm Europe debt-financed proposal, continue to generate internal frictions.

Russia has moved quickly to exploit this hesitation. Cooperation with Iran and North Korea has deepened through treaties and partnerships in recent years, allowing Moscow to replenish ammunition stocks and expand drone capabilities. European intelligence reports indicate an increase in cyber activity linked to Russian groups, with recent attempts targeting energy and transport networks in Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. These developments reinforce fears that Europe remains vulnerable to hybrid pressure even as the physical front in Ukraine advances slowly.

At the political level, the landscape inside Europe has become more complicated. In addition to those in the Czech Republic, elections in the Netherlands brought new uncertainties about the country’s future approach to EU defense policy. Slovakia’s government has slowed its support for Ukraine, raising questions about the coherence of the bloc’s sanctions strategy. Germany’s ruling coalition, while meeting the 2 percent GDP spending target through a major investment fund, remains divided on the long-term sustainability of defense budgets. Even in France, where the government has called for stronger European capabilities, disagreements persist over how far and how fast such efforts should go. These national shifts highlight a broader trend of populist and Eurosceptic influences challenging the unity needed for ambitious collective defense goals.

U.S. domestic politics continue to cast a long shadow. Although Washington has not altered troop levels in Europe amid an ongoing Pentagon global posture review, the review reflects a desire to maintain flexibility and avoid new commitments, shifting more burden to allies. Officials have emphasized priorities in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. This reinforces European doubts about relying too heavily on American support over the long term. Even as existing commitments continue, the perception of unpredictability is forcing Europe to reassess fundamental assumptions.

The central question is whether Europe can close the gap between its rhetoric and its capabilities. The EU’s new industrial programs—SAFE loans and the €1.5 billion EDIP initiative—aim to increase defense production, but it will take years before output reaches the levels required to replace decades of underinvestment. Russia’s ability to adapt under sanctions has surprised many European policymakers, exposing weaknesses in earlier assessments of the conflict’s economic impact. These misjudgments have added pressure on governments to revise strategies that assumed the Kremlin would face greater difficulties sustaining the war.

Europe is now confronted with immediate operational challenges and long-term structural ones. Governments must provide Ukraine with enough support to stabilize the battlefield during the winter. They must also build the industrial depth needed for future contingencies, whether related to Russia or to other threats that may emerge. This requires political clarity, financial commitment, and a more honest assessment of Europe’s vulnerabilities. The decisions made now will shape not only the future of the conflict in Ukraine but also Europe’s role in global security. Other regions, including Asia, have a strong interest in the outcome.

This first ran on FPIF.

The post The Limits of European Strategic Autonomy appeared first on CounterPunch.org.

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