This editorial by Enrique Dussel Peters originally appeared in the January 21, 2026 edition of La Jornada, Mexico’s premier left wing daily newspaper. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mexico Solidarity Media or the Mexico Solidarity Project*.*
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney recently completed a four-day visit to China (January 14-17, 2026). Its implications are of paramount importance for the Americas, the focus of the new US national security policy, which was announced in late November 2025.
The recent context of Canada’s relationship with the United States is significant, considering a nearly 9,000-kilometer border and a very long historical, migratory, economic, and cultural relationship, also full of complexities. In 2024, approximately 76 percent of Canada’s exports were concentrated in the United States, a percentage surpassed only by Mexico (83 percent). China has consolidated its position as Canada’s second-largest trading partner, also with growing trade deficits (although not as high as Mexico’s deficit with Canada’s energy and mineral exports).
Beyond Trump’s numerous pronouncements about Canada—repeatedly since 2025, aiming to make Canada the 51st US state, not unlike his ambitions in Greenland—relations with the United States have become increasingly unpredictable and erratic. Until the end of 2025, Washington imposed a 35 percent tariff on Canadian goods, with the exception of energy products and potash (10 percent). Trump has emphasized that he does not need Canada or its trade, and the various bilateral trade negotiations have not yielded concrete results until early 2026, despite increased border spending by the Canadian government to reduce undocumented immigration and increase fentanyl seizures, among other things.
As recent as mid-January 2026, Trump dismissed the USMCA as “irrelevant” and explicitly stated regarding Canada that “if they can make a trade deal with China, that’s what they should do.” At the same time, the US president has focused his attention on Canada and the Canadian Arctic (1.4 million square kilometers) and its relevance to the new national security strategy.
The first of the “Two Michaels”: Canadian Michael Kovrig, an inept spy whose own employer International Crisis Group (funded by NATO governments) admitted on Canadian state television that Kovrig was involved in “non-traditional intelligence gathering in China” with dissident ethnic populations and was accused by the other Michael of dragging him into espionage activities in a successful lawsuit against Canada’s federal government, was detained by the People’s Republic of China in December 2018.
Canada’s contemporary relations with China, on the other hand, have also been complex. In 2018, bilateral relations experienced significant strain following the arrest of Meng Wanzhou (Huawei’s chief financial officer) in Vancouver and two Canadians in China; accusations of Chinese interference in internal affairs and mutual tariff increases (on electric vehicles and various canola products, among others) reflected the atmosphere of deep mistrust between the two sides.
In this context, the new Carney administration has sought to emphasize options for effectively diversifying Canada’s international relations and trade (with the explicit goal of increasing non-U.S. trade by up to 50 percent over the next 10 years); initially through the meeting with President Xi Jinping in South Korea in October 2025 and now through his visit to Beijing. At least three aspects are significant regarding the outcome of this meeting in mid-January 2026.
On the one hand, China attached great importance to the Canadian visit, emphasizing their differing national circumstances and the importance of respecting its sovereignty to overcome recent bilateral limitations. Multiple meetings between the Canadian delegation and China resulted in cooperation agreements on trade, customs, energy, construction, culture, and public security.
Second. The joint statement from China and Canada highlights the new strategic partnership between the two nations and emphasizes key aspects: resolving trade disputes, improving the business environment for companies from both countries, and various follow-up actions on bilaterally agreed issues, in addition to agricultural and financial matters, and the commitment to support multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations system. These commitments will need to be monitored in the short and medium term. As a first step, Canada allowed an import quota of 49,000 electric vehicles with a tariff of 6.1 percent (below the previous 100 percent and in line with measures taken by the United States), and China would reduce the tariff on canola and its byproducts to an average of approximately 15 percent (below the previous 84 percent), among other products.
In 2024, approximately 76 percent of Canada’s exports were concentrated in the United States, a percentage surpassed only by Mexico at 83 percent.
Third. Carney’s visit is also particularly relevant for Canada from a medium- and long-term strategic perspective. It is a meeting in Beijing, already in the midst of discussions on the review/renegotiation of the USMCA; Canada is asserting its right to diversify its international relations with China (and other countries) in the face of the erratic measures of Trump’s second presidency, who seems to acknowledge and give his approval, while continuing to pressure Canada on its territorial claims and in the USMCA negotiations themselves.
All of the above is fundamental for Latin America and the Caribbean. The United States and Trump have been very clear in their new national security strategy and their aggressive relationship with the region (La Jornada, 10/12/25). Countries like Brazil, and now Canada, have taken steps to—without abandoning their relationship with the United States—allow for effective strategic diversification, including trade aspects, but from a much broader perspective than just the economic one.
While it might have been argued until recently that countries like Brazil possess unparalleled geographical, historical, and economic advantages, Carney’s recent visit to China invalidates this interpretation. For Canada, this represents a concrete and substantive strategic move with significant implications for the new global triangular relationships. Carney has repeatedly acknowledged a new global (trade) order and the critical importance of the United States in the face of China’s growing influence.
And Mexico?
Enrique Dussel Peters is head of the Centre for China-Mexico Studies (CECHIMEX) at Mexico’s National Autonomous University (UNAM). He is also coordinator of the China-Latin America Academic Network (Red ALC-China).
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