By Sowaida Nezami, Feroza Hanifi, and Afghanistan Project Team (PEAI), February 11, 2026
In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a peace agreement in Doha, which was a pivotal moment in Afghanistan’s political trajectory. The agreement was framed as a pathway toward ending decades of conflict between the Taliban and the United States. However, this peace agreement excluded the Afghan people and government. The agreement consisted of four key elements: first, the US withdrawal of its military forces, along with those of its allies. Second, the Taliban pledged to prevent any terrorist group, including al-Qaeda, from using Afghan territory to threaten the security of the US and its allies. Third, the agreement called for direct negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, which was called “intra-Afghan dialogue.” Lastly, it aimed to achieve a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire in Afghanistan (US Department of State, 2020). Out of the four terms, the evacuation of US soldiers was the only one that was truly accomplished.
The first step in empowering the Taliban was the United States’ decision to separate its agreement with the Taliban from a broader peace settlement involving the Afghan government. The talks were initially designed in two stages: first, direct negotiations between the US and the Taliban on troop withdrawal and counterterrorism assurances; second, intra-Afghan negotiations to determine Afghanistan’s political future and secure a ceasefire (IBRAHIMI & SABA, 2026). However, the Taliban refused to engage with the Afghan government. As a result, the US revised its approach and concluded an agreement with the Taliban limited to withdrawal and counterterrorism issues. This shift delayed negotiations on the Afghan government’s role and a comprehensive ceasefire, making them dependent on the Taliban’s future willingness to negotiate.
This shift in negotiation dynamics significantly undermined the Afghan government’s position, making the peace process uncertain and fragile. The resulting agreement failed to secure sustainable peace in Afghanistan and led to the eventual disintegration of the democratically elected government, ultimately allowing the Taliban to seize military control over it. The signing of the Doha Agreement emphasized the US-Taliban discussions while relegating intra-Afghan talks to a secondary concern. This two-track negotiation strategy allowed the Taliban to secure its main objectives early. As a result, its stronger position reduced the incentive to engage in meaningful negotiations with the Afghan government (Sadr, O. 2024). The withdrawal of international forces significantly strengthened the Taliban, enabling them to expand their control in Afghanistan through military victories. The agreement allowed attacks on Afghan targets while protecting US forces, effectively incentivizing violence against the Afghan state. Ultimately, the Doha Agreement provided the Taliban with political legitimacy and a strategic edge, facilitating their return to power through force instead of fostering sustainable peace (Akbari F, 2026).
This article is written from the result of a 2-month project that was supported by the WBW organization. The initiative was developed around several interconnected objectives. First, it aimed to challenge the growing normalization of Afghan exclusion from peace processes. At the same time, it sought to create youth-led platforms that encourage meaningful political dialogue. Another key objective was to document public perspectives on the Doha peace process and better understand its implications. Finally, the initiative aimed to promote the principles of inclusive and participatory peacebuilding, emphasizing the importance of local voices in shaping peace efforts.
Perceptions of Exclusion and Interpretations of the Doha Agreement
Across both survey and interview data, respondents consistently perceived the Doha peace process (US-Taliban) and the resulting agreement as exclusionary and externally driven, with minimal meaningful representation of Afghan citizens. The overwhelming majority of participants reported that people from across Afghanistan’s society, including members of their communities, had no voice in the negotiations. Five respondents expressed a sense of inclusion, and even in these cases, representation was understood as the formal presence of negotiators rather than genuine public participation. Questionnaire responses further emphasized that Afghans define peace not simply as the end of violence, but as a condition that includes social justice, rights, accountability, and inclusive participation.
Questionnaire Participants widely described exclusion as structural and intentional rather than accidental. The Doha Agreement was commonly viewed as a confidential and non-transparent arrangement designed primarily to serve external interests, particularly those of the United States and the Taliban. Many respondents characterized the agreement as a mechanism to manage U.S. troop withdrawal and facilitate a transfer of power, rather than as a comprehensive peace settlement addressing Afghan societal needs. As a result, most participants rejected the idea that the agreement produced “peace” in a holistic sense, arguing that justice, stability, and equitable participation were largely absent. Although a small minority acknowledged the agreement’s stated aim of ending the conflict, skepticism remained dominant regarding its true intentions and outcomes.
Expert interviews highlighted the Taliban’s persistent refusal to engage with the Afghan government and civil society, which severely limited participatory mechanisms and weakened the position of the Afghanistan government in the negotiations. Interview data further linked these perceptions to the structure of the peace process itself. The U.S.–Taliban bilateral format, conducted largely in secrecy, excluded the Afghan government from key negotiations and significantly weakened Kabul’s position in later intra-Afghan talks. By granting the Taliban de facto legitimacy without clear or enforceable obligations, the Doha Agreement created deep structural imbalances that undermined the prospects for an inclusive and equitable political settlement.
During the Doha intra‑Afghan peace negotiations, several other countries had considerable influence, most notably Qatar. According to interviewees, Qatar was not a neutral party. For years, the Taliban and their families lived in Qatar; they had offices there and even received salaries and facilities from the Qatari government.
Ms. Sarabi, a participant in the Doha process(intra-Afghan), emphasized that the negotiations “were a mission for us, whereas for them it was not a mission in that sense; It was a kind of normal life.” The Taliban attended the meetings at their convenience and could simply decline to appear. She recalled, “For example, they would say, ‘We will come after the evening prayer,’ because they had business activities; once those were finished, they arrived after the prayer.” Ms. Sarabi added that “we even noticed during some meetings that Qatar was clearly taking sides.”
Pakistan also played a crucial role in shaping the Doha process, influencing the Taliban not only through political ties but also because many Taliban families and relatives reside in Pakistan. This dynamic markedly affected the bargaining process. As Ms. Sarabi noted, “At the beginning of the new year we had to return to Afghanistan for the holidays. During those same 15 days of leave, the Taliban went to Pakistan because their families and relatives were there. All of this had a significant impact on the negotiation process.”
longstanding issues such as corruption, political fragmentation, weak legitimacy of state representatives, and centralized decision-making before 2021 eroded public trust in Afghan institutions. Interviewees supported these views, noting that centralized governance undermined coordination and marginalized key actors, while elite fragmentation created recurring political crises that the Taliban were able to exploit. Collectively, these dynamics normalized exclusion and entrenched a political culture in which Afghan citizens were systematically sidelined.
Continuity of Exclusion Post-2020
The structure and priorities of the Doha negotiations directly contribute to the continuation of exclusion after 2020. As one of the interviewees highlighted, formal talks between the United States and the Taliban began in 2018 under the Trump administration and continued for approximately eighteen months, largely in secrecy. While confidentiality is common in peace processes, the deliberate exclusion of the Afghan government and other key domestic actors raised serious concerns about the durability and legitimacy of the outcome. Although U.S. policymakers initially acknowledged the need to involve the Afghan government, the United States ultimately accepted the Taliban’s demand to exclude the Afghan government. As a result, the negotiations focused primarily on facilitating U.S. military withdrawal rather than establishing a genuine and inclusive peace framework. The sequencing of direct U.S.–Taliban talks followed by an intra-Afghan dialogue further limited Kabul’s influence and effectively predetermined outcomes.
This exclusionary approach reflected long-standing historical patterns in Afghan peace efforts. Respondents and experts alike compared the Doha process to earlier settlements, including the Soviet-Afghan negotiations that excluded major Mujahideen factions and the 2001 post-conflict settlement, where significant Afghan actors were similarly sidelined. In this sense, exclusion was not an unintended consequence but an embedded feature of externally mediated agreements in Afghanistan. Participants identified several interconnected factors reinforcing this dynamic, including the prioritization of geopolitical interests over public engagement, the Taliban’s refusal to interact with Afghan governance structures and society, persistent insecurity that restricted participation, and pre-existing governance failures that weakened state legitimacy. By granting the Taliban de facto legitimacy without enforcing key commitments, such as a ceasefire or meaningful intra-Afghan dialogue, the process contributed to structural imbalances that accelerated the collapse of the Afghan Republic. The interviewees further noted that internal rivalries among Afghan elites prevented the formation of a unified political front, creating a power vacuum that the Taliban effectively exploited. The Taliban’s own fractured and divided structure has made political involvement more difficult and damaged the likelihood of a long-lasting and cohesive solution. Moreover, they argued that at various points U.S. policy made use of armed non-state actors, including the Taliban, to place pressure on the Afghan government, which in turn increased Afghanistan’s dependence on the United States. In addition, Pakistan’s involvement was viewed as a strategic factor that further limited Afghanistan’s sovereignty and reduced the prospects for genuine political independence.
This exclusion, especially with regard to women, has affected the country not only politically but also economically. One interviewee noted that international aid to Afghanistan has declined in recent years in part because of the exclusion of women. Research and reports from international organizations corroborate this view, indicating that restrictions on women’s education and participation in the workforce have had serious economic consequences and have been linked to reduced donor support and economic contraction (United Nations, 2025). Women constitute more than half of the population, and their systematic exclusion from public life undermines the country’s social structures and limits human and economic development.
The persistence of exclusion beyond 2020 remains evident in current international engagement with Afghanistan. Seventy-five percent of respondents indicated that international and regional actors continue to interact primarily with the Taliban. For example, Russia has taken notable steps toward normalizing relations with the Taliban authorities. In April, Russia’s Supreme Court removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations, signaling a shift in Moscow’s approach (Jazeera, 2025). Russia, which previously described the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as a “failure,” has since sought closer engagement with the Taliban, viewing them as a potential economic partner and as an actor in regional counterterrorism efforts (Jazeera, 2025). These developments illustrate how international interactions with Afghanistan increasingly center on the Taliban, reinforcing patterns of exclusion.
Apart from Russia, which has formally recognized the Taliban government, countries such as China, Pakistan, Iran, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan have accepted Taliban representatives or allowed them to operate diplomatic missions (Esennett, 2025). According to reports, Bangladesh has also welcomed Taliban delegates, and a group of Bangladeshi academics traveled to Afghanistan to deepen relations in September 2025 (Bašić, 2025). Together, these findings demonstrate that exclusion has become a sustained feature of both the peace process and post-2020 international engagement with Afghanistan. Respondents generally believed that the international community has adopted a pragmatic approach that prioritizes access and security over inclusive consultation.
The Role of Afghan Youth in Addressing Exclusion
Youth are pivotal in local peacebuilding efforts, acting as agents of social cohesion and catalysts for community involvement. Effective governance and service delivery hinge on the participation of diverse local actors, including youth, despite their marginalization in formal decision-making.
According to the respondents, Afghan youth are an important group that could challenge long-standing exclusionary practices. They identified a number of ways that young people could become more influential, such as taking part in civic initiatives, using digital platforms more frequently to share their opinions globally, and building cross-regional and cross-ethnic networks to strengthen collective advocacy. Respondents also noted the importance of youth involvement in knowledge production, public dialogue, and community initiatives that promote social unity and human rights.
The responses indicate two primary barriers to meaningful youth participation. The first concerns the persistent climate of fear and insecurity that more than 40% of respondents voted for. Respondents noted that political repression and threats against activists severely limit youth engagement, especially inside Afghanistan. The second barrier is the lack of accessible and safe platforms for political expression that more than 23% of them mentioned. Several participants pointed to restricted educational opportunities, limited mobility and the erosion of civic institutions as additional factors that constrain youth involvement. These findings demonstrate that although Afghan youth are motivated and capable, structural obstacles significantly limit their opportunities to contribute to national decision-making.
Respondents highlighted various strategies for enhancing inclusivity in future engagements by international and regional actors concerning Afghanistan. A prominent recommendation was to establish direct communication channels with Afghan citizens, particularly focusing on under-represented groups such as women, youth, and civil society representatives. Additionally, several participants suggested that international assistance and diplomatic efforts should be structured around specific human rights and participation benchmarks, ensuring that such measures are measurable and accountable.
A critical stance emphasized by interviewees was the importance of not recognizing the Taliban as the exclusive representative of Afghanistan; instead, advocating for supportive measures that foster inclusive forums involving various Afghan voices. The participants further encouraged international stakeholders to invest in mechanisms that facilitate local consultations within Afghanistan, thereby reducing dependency on external, mediated, or filtered information sources.
Moreover, a concerning trend regarding the erosion of rights was noted, wherein the resurgence of realism in global governance diminishes the role of values such as women’s rights in foreign policy. International actors have been seen to prioritize strategic and security interests over human rights, allowing for continued internal repression in Afghanistan.
Finally, the discourse underscored the gender imperative for peace, articulated by Ms. Akbari, who asserted that “true peace cannot be attained without recognizing women as full rights-holders.” The exclusion of women from political and social spheres is not merely a failure of moral responsibility but a major structural barrier to achieving lasting peace in Afghanistan. It is also important to remember that inclusion must not be merely symbolic, as it was under the previous government, but instead meaningful and free from imposed restrictions. As Ms. Akbari has emphasized, “the inclusion of women means their active participation in consultation, decision-making, policy design, and implementation, rather than the presence of token women’s rights without real power or influence.”
Conclusion
Elite-driven peace processes are typically negotiated by political or military leaders, often excluding local communities from decision-making. While these processes can achieve formal agreements quickly, they risk overlooking grassroots needs and may lack local legitimacy, making implementation fragile. In contrast, participatory peace processes actively involve civil society actors, community leaders, and ordinary citizens, ensuring that local perspectives, grievances, and priorities shape the peace agenda. Such inclusion not only strengthens the legitimacy and sustainability of peace initiatives but also fosters trust and social cohesion at the community level. Combining national-level negotiations with local participation can create a more comprehensive and durable approach to peacebuilding. Afghan ownership is not a symbolic principle but a practical necessity. Peace processes that fail to embed local voices and social participation risk perpetuating instability and undermining legitimacy. The path forward demands a deliberate reorientation: placing Afghan society, not external interests, at the center of peacebuilding efforts, and recognizing that durable peace depends on the inseparable combination of political settlements and social cohesion. In summary, the goal of the Doha peace talks was to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan without any casualties, but it was disguised as a peace agreement.
The convergence of all data streams (expert interviews + questionnaire responses) provides a single, powerful conclusion: Afghanistan’s past peace efforts failed because they normalized the exclusion of the Afghan people.
In the end, I want to conclude this article with a statement from one of our interviewees, Ms. Akbari, who said, “Our narrative has to be told by ourselves.”
We, the youth, must change the patterns that repeatedly lead to the same outcome; war and destruction. We have to raise our voices and break this cycle that has caused us to suffer for decades. As someone from a generation that has witnessed conflict and explosions since childhood, I want to do everything in my power to stop this cycle so that at least the generations that come after us will not have to suffer the way we did.
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