Photograph Source: Prime Minister’s Office (GODL-India) – GODL-India

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin offered the kind of optics global diplomacy excels at: smiling leaders, carefully staged photo ops, and an air of harmony. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stood alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, presenting an image of multipolar unity—a tableau meant to signal that a world long dominated by the West now has alternative centers of power. Yet beneath the surface, this performance revealed more about shifting alliances and simmering tensions than any genuine convergence.

For Modi, the trip carried symbolic weight. It marked his first visit to China since the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which plunged India-China relations to their lowest point in decades. His bilateral with Xi was predictably cautious. They spoke about border stability, trade, and “mutual respect,” a phrase that has become a diplomatic placeholder rather than a policy prescription. Modi’s presence signaled pragmatism: even as India deepens ties with the West, it cannot afford to disengage from a neighbor whose economy dwarfs its own and whose influence shapes the region.

Modi’s encounter with Putin was warmer. The two leaders shared a limousine ride in Putin’s Aurus sedan, an image that harkened back to the old Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle once touted as a counterweight to U.S.-led alliances. The nostalgia was palpable, but nostalgia is not strategy. Russia’s position in the world has shifted dramatically; its deepening isolation from the West has made Moscow increasingly dependent on Beijing, and its partnership with India now carries more symbolism than substance.

The summit unfolded against a fraught backdrop for Delhi. Modi’s visit came just months after a dangerous skirmish with Pakistan in May, a reminder of South Asia’s enduring volatility. Indian officials accuse Beijing of providing Islamabad with real-time intelligence during the clash—an allegation China denies but one that reinforces India’s perception of a Sino-Pakistani axis. Modi’s comments at the SCO about combating terrorism “without double standards” were widely read as a rebuke to Beijing’s reluctance to confront Pakistan-based militant groups.

Complicating matters further is the Trump factor. Since returning to the White House, Donald Trump has imposed a 50 percent tariff on Indian exports, ostensibly in response to Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian oil. Yet the decision also followed a public spat over Trump’s claim that he personally brokered the India-Pakistan ceasefire, a claim Modi has been consistently denying. The episode, capped by inflammatory remarks from Trump’s trade advisor, has injected fresh tension into U.S.-India relations. For Delhi, this was a reminder that Washington can be both an indispensable partner and a volatile one.

In this context, Modi’s appearance in Tianjin looked less like rapprochement with Beijing and more like hedging against uncertainty. The SCO offers India an alternative diplomatic arena where the Global South’s grievances take center stage, Chinese capital flows freely, and Russian energy deals are struck at a discount. The Tianjin Declaration, which condemned the April Pahalgam terror attack and endorsed multilateral trade, aligned neatly with Delhi’s priorities. Modi used the platform to promote connectivity projects like Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor—initiatives that bypass Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and underline India’s strategic autonomy.

Xi Jinping’s unveiling of the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) added another layer of complexity. The initiative seeks to reform global institutions to reflect a multipolar reality, a message that resonates in much of the developing world. Modi’s polite acknowledgment of the plan signals Delhi’s willingness to engage without fully endorsing Beijing’s vision. India remains deeply skeptical of China’s leadership role in global governance, especially given their unresolved border disputes and competing regional ambitions.

Indeed, despite the smiles and symbolism, India-China relations remain precarious. The Line of Actual Control is still militarized, and December 2024’s renaming of Ladakh locations by Beijing—interpreted in India as cartographic aggression—underscores persistent distrust. Economically, India’s post-Galwan restrictions on Chinese investment and tech firms remain in place. Politically, Modi’s ruling coalition benefits domestically from a tough-on-China posture, limiting his room for maneuver.

A genuine reset would require meaningful concessions from both sides. India would need to recalibrate its involvement in the Quad, Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy that Beijing views as containment. But such recalibration seems unlikely. Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy has heightened Indian anxieties about overdependence on the United States, even as China’s growing assertiveness along the border makes rapprochement politically toxic in Delhi.

India’s balancing act is becoming more precarious. Its “multi-alignment” strategy—partnering with Washington on security, buying oil from Russia, and engaging Beijing on trade—is increasingly tested by intensifying great-power rivalry. The SCO provides a venue to showcase India’s diplomatic dexterity, but the underlying realities are stark: Russia is drifting firmly into China’s orbit, Beijing is challenging India’s regional influence, and the United States is demanding clearer alignments. Modi’s rapid departure from Tianjin, skipping China’s Victory Day parade, suggests he understands the limits of symbolism.

Seen in a broader context, the SCO summit is a snapshot of a world in flux rather than a turning point. The organization itself is emblematic of a shifting order: it is neither an anti-Western bloc nor a cohesive alliance, but rather a forum where powers like China, Russia, and India can project influence while managing friction. Its rhetoric of multipolarity reflects a genuine global sentiment, particularly in the Global South, but also masks sharp internal divisions.

For India, participation in the SCO is a strategic necessity, not an ideological commitment. It allows Delhi to hedge against Washington’s unpredictability, maintain dialogue with Beijing, and keep Moscow engaged. Yet this strategy carries risks. The Trump administration’s tariffs have exposed vulnerabilities in India’s trade profile, while its reliance on Russian energy ties Delhi closer to a partner increasingly beholden to Beijing. Meanwhile, tensions with China remain a constant threat, with every border flare-up capable of undoing years of careful diplomacy.

The Tianjin summit’s imagery—a smiling Modi flanked by Xi and Putin—will feature prominently in coverage of India’s foreign policy. But these visuals obscure more than they reveal. The reality is a complex geopolitical poker game in which India seeks to maximize its leverage without being drawn into any single camp. The SCO provides a platform for that, but it is not a solution to India’s deeper strategic challenges. Modi’s presence in Tianjin was a reminder that India is indispensable in any future balance of power. But it was also a reminder that power is shifting unevenly, and that symbolism, while useful, cannot substitute for strategy.

This first appeared on FPIF.

The post The Limits of India/China Rapprochement appeared first on CounterPunch.org.

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