This paper by Jorge Hernández Martínez was presented at the 29th International Seminar of the Workers’ Party of Mexico (Partido del Trabajo México) in Mexico City.
The International Seminar is an annual gathering of socialist, Communist and left wing parties from across five continents to discuss. The topic this year was Parties and a New Society and participants included the Workers Party (Brazil), FMLN (El Salvador), PSUV (Venezuela), Communist Party of China, Communist Party of Cuba, Communist Party of Chile, FSLN (Nicaragua), COMUNES (Colombia, formerly FARC), Communist Party of Vietnam, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, National Liberation Front (Algeria), German Communist Party, Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), Workers Party of Korea, Communist Party of Spain, Communist Party of Egypt, Popular Revolutionary Party of Laos, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Socialist Front of Puerto Rico, Polisario Front, and many, many others.
Jorge Hernández Martínez is Director of the Center for Hemispheric and US Studies at the Central University of Havana) and professor at the Department of History and International Relations at the Ñico López University of the Communist Party of Cuba.
Although analysis and discussion about the restructuring taking place in the system of international relations and, in particular, in the architecture of contemporary capitalism has gained momentum in recent years, this is not a new process; it has been underway for more than three decades. The dynamic that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s transformed the international balance of power, as the geopolitical bipolarity that had served as the axis of the Cold War period since the Second World War disappeared, along with the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe. Since then, other changes have accumulated, also with significant global implications, such as those resulting from the Gulf War in the aforementioned decade, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the financial crisis that unfolded in 2008, the COVID-19 pandemic between 2020 and 2021, the war in Ukraine, and the conflict with Russia starting in 2022.
This paper aims to contribute to the analysis of changes in the architecture of contemporary capitalism within the broader context of the reconfiguration of the international order, taking the United States—given its central place and role in the global imperialist system—as the focus of scrutiny. It is based on the premise that this is an unfinished process, entailing a profound economic restructuring, accompanied by political, social, ideological, and cultural changes, which together express a relative hegemonic decline of the aforementioned country, amidst a global dispute of a geopolitical nature, inseparable from the geo-economic dimension. and that the change in the world order created after the Second World War is noted, with defined expressions at its core, since the great crisis of 2008, with antecedents evident in the crises of the 1970s, which led to the so-called Conservative Revolution, with comprehensive implications, of global resonance, from which a drastic, structural change is drawn, which supposed a repositioning of the United States as the epicenter of the system.
Hence, the United States is experiencing a crisis defined not only by economic problems and difficulties, but by a complex of contradictions encompassing the political, social, ideological, cultural, ecological, and strategic, manifesting themselves on a complex international scale, at the global level. This is not a cyclical crisis, but a structural one, a crisis of restructuring, which has the potential to become a systemic crisis. In this sense, the crisis is an essential part of the very dynamic of constant restructuring of capitalist modernity, which contemporary imperialism entails, whose geopolitical configuration has become broader and deeper.
Today, the great contradictions accumulated during the historical development of capitalism no longer seem to have a satisfactory solution within the confines of the traditional logic of capital and the ways in which the world system operates. Contradictions are part of the system itself, and the way out of one crisis contains within itself the roots of the next, revealing a cyclical nature.
Since World War II, the history of the United States demonstrates that the structures and contexts that have accompanied capitalist development in that country have conditioned a great adaptive capacity of contemporary imperialism, which has been able to make adjustments and readjustments that have allowed it to absorb and overcome the recurring effects of its own crises. This process includes, among the main trends defining the international system, the hegemonic consolidation of that country, the strengthening of geopolitical bipolarity between the two opposing systems (capitalism and socialism), and the beginning of the Cold War. Thus, the development of American imperialism entered a new phase, with the country acquiring a new place and role in the late 1940s. Since then, the United States has become, amid crises and restructurings, the most powerful power in the world and the leader of global capitalism. Its geopolitical projections play a fundamental role in the global restructuring of international relations, redefining its alliances with countries it considers friends, its rivalries with those it defines as enemies, and its interference in the regions where new areas of influence and control are then contested: those of the so-called Third World. The quest for hegemony has been, since that time, throughout the second half of the 20th century, the main axis of imperialist geopolitics.
Economic crises, or shocks in international relations, that affect the United States’ position of strength in international relations, along with the problem of the decline of American power, reappear in the literature on foreign policy and international relations. To the extent that the weaknesses of that economy relative to the rest of the world and its major competitors have been revealed, or evidence of its strength has emerged, the problem of the decline of American power, or its return as the principal and sole imperialist superpower, returns.
Issues such as the inconvertibility of the US dollar into gold, announced unilaterally during Richard Nixon’s presidency in 1971, and the dollar’s continued dominance in the global economy more than five decades later, demonstrate that US policy is resisting an adjustment in the global economic order that would cause it to lose its global hegemony. This unilateral decision by the United States led to a significant shift in the international monetary system, shifting from a system of fixed exchange rates anchored to the gold standard to the free floating of currencies in foreign exchange markets since 1973. It also led to a reduction in productive competitiveness compared to other Asian economies in the 1970s; it generated macroeconomic imbalances in the external sector and was one of the first manifestations of the relative economic decline of the United States.
More recently, the growing fiscal deficit and massive public debt have renewed concerns about the sustainability of imperialism as a hegemonic power in the coming years, stemming essentially from the privileges still enjoyed by the US dollar.
Among the main contributions to the problem of the decline of great powers, from a historical perspective, is the work published by Paul Kennedy [The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers], originally in English in 1987 and in Spanish in 1994. This book on the rise and fall of great powers, although not exclusively devoted to the analysis of the United States, is extremely useful because it demonstrates the economic, technological, military, and political factors that have determined the rise and decline of different empires throughout history, recording regularities. The unsustainability of public spending, and particularly those related to military and security spending, to maintain hegemonic status, leads to the effect known as “imperial bloat.” Attempts to maintain and strengthen their system of domination extend beyond their capabilities. In this work, Kennedy makes an important observation:
“In all discussions about the erosion of American preeminence, it must be repeated again and again that the decline in question is relative, not absolute, and therefore entirely natural, and that the only serious threat to the true interests of the United States can only come from a failure to adapt sensibly to the new world order.”
Huge fiscal deficits, overflowing public debt, and the external debt of the United States relative to the rest of the world are evidence of this oversizing, or relative loss of competitiveness. The persistence of these imbalances over many years demonstrates their structural nature, and therefore it is recommended to adjust the foreign policy strategy and the scope of its objectives to the available resources. Immanuel Wallerstein has addressed this issue for the United States as part of his vision of the global capitalist system. Regarding the decline of US power, he establishes a periodization of hegemonic cycles and defines the beginning of US hegemonic decline in the 1970s.
There are opposing approaches to American decline, which assume that the United States is exceptional and therefore behaves differently. Joseph Nye believes that the United States retains the foundations for maintaining its leadership, supported by other sources and instruments of power, not just military, such as information dominance, databases, global networks, and the global speculative financial system—areas of undisputed American supremacy. For his part, Henry R. Nau warns that the ideas about the decline of the great powers expressed by Paul Kennedy do not correspond to the situation in the United States. This author, as early as 1990, referred to what he called the myth of American decline. Another critical work on the decline of the great powers was written by George L. Bernstein, who insists on the relativity of this assertion.
The relative nature of the decline must be taken into account because it is a process of comparison with other emerging powers in the global balance of power, and because the power of the United States has not diminished in absolute terms. It is the only military superpower, and even economically it continues to grow, albeit at a slower pace. The problem is the unsustainability of its system of global domination and exploitation, the timeframe for its final decline, and what international relations will be like then.
From an imperialist perspective, they require adjustments to address economic imbalances, which could undermine their strength, and to seek readjustments in the rebalancing of global power. However, there is no capitalism without cyclical economic crises, nor eternal imperialism. The United States is no exception.
Additionally, there are numerous studies on China’s rise as a global power and its growing role in global geoeconomics and geopolitics, in information and communications technologies, and other areas. However, this does not allow for an immediate and precise prediction of China’s replacement of the United States as the global hegemonic power, based on projections of the growth rates of their respective gross domestic products. The concern of American strategists is expressed in the search for options to counter the rise of Chinese power through various variants.
However, the rise of China as the new hegemon of the world economic order, based on its economic, technological, military, and other aspects, accompanied by regional integration processes, strategic partnerships with other countries, and the enlarged BRICS group, do not yet allow us to affirm that a new, alternative, multipolar, and fair international economic order has been achieved to replace the current one. Nor does China’s political and economic strategy seek confrontation with the United States. While it is firm and belligerent in its long-term objectives, it does not consider dissociating itself from the international economic system, the IMF, or the World Bank, nor does it repudiate the use of the dollar. Although it deploys bilateral agreements with other powers and countries to implement independent mechanisms for conducting trade and financial transactions among them.
This does not rule out the possibility of such a transformation in the world economic order occurring in the future, but the current situation, characterized by great uncertainty, wars, and confrontation involving both the United States and its main allies, as well as China and the expansion of its influence in international economic and political relations, makes it extremely difficult to predict the scenarios of this new international economic order based on growth projections and the political tendencies of the major powers.
Despite being in a declining phase of its hegemony since at least the 1970s, the United States continues to hold primacy in the global economy as the largest financial economy, the only military superpower, and retains leadership in instruments of political power based on global information networks and communications technologies. Furthermore, through the so-called entertainment industry, the cultural patterns, preferences, and values of its society are introduced to the world, directly or indirectly impacting social and political consciousness worldwide. The majority control of communications infrastructure, from satellites and other networks to connect these media globally, encompasses the sphere of intelligence and espionage, linked to the internet and so-called social media. This is a sphere of US dominance of great importance for preserving its leadership and system of domination, known as soft power.
Today, the globalization of the capital market exacerbates the parasitic features of imperialism by placing the main source of power within that market in the financial sphere, which entails its own problems in the bursting of speculative bubbles, rather than in the realm of material production or trade. In other words, the main foundations of US economic power rest not fundamentally in the real economy, but rather in the financial sphere and its majority control over the distribution of wealth through the global capital market and transnational corporations.
For his part, Joseph Stiglitz summarizes the main problems of the American economy as “unbridled financialization , mismanaged globalization, and the growing power of the market.” These conservative policies favored the transnational financial sector and progressively deteriorated the situation, especially for the middle class and manufacturing workers.
The first economic crises of the 21st century resulted from the exacerbation of contradictions due to the economic policies of what is known as market-deregulating neoliberal globalization. The purpose of these crises has been to redistribute the economy’s income in favor of the top 1 percent, the concentrators of economic wealth and political power, certainly to counteract the downward trend in profit shares.
From any perspective, there is no doubt that capitalist economies exhibit economic cycles with upswings and downswings, peaks and troughs, and varying durations. Defenders of the system downplay their problems and always try to attribute them to external factors. Jeffrey Sachs asserts that “business cycles are not fixed waves of economic activity, like ocean tides or solar cycles” and classifies them as “random shocks that batter the economy.” Natural disasters, hurricanes, droughts, pandemics, and wars are cited as causative factors.
These factors exogenous to the socioeconomic system contribute to unleashing economic crises or making them more complex and difficult, but the causes are the systemic and structural contradictions of the capitalist system in general. In the case of the United States, the specific problems and contradictions that correspond to the current stage of imperialism it is experiencing, as the main center of the capitalist economy and finance, must be considered.
The financial and economic crises of the first decade of the 21st century—in 2001 and, above all, in 2008—tested the validity of the conservative policies of so-called neoliberal globalization to sustain and restore the United States’ position as the main imperialist power in the new century. Technically, there have been two, not counting the one unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The first two were triggered by the bursting of speculative bubbles—a phenomenon exacerbated by financial deregulation and economic globalization, which, when they burst, unleashed their respective economic crises. The onset of the recession was preceded by the fall of the stock market, and its end lagged behind the recovery of the capital market, reflecting the growing parasitism of the economy. Employment recovery was slower, and high levels of unemployment persisted in the early years of the recovery. The crises of 2001 and 2008 are explained by internal contradictions linked, fundamentally, to the financialization of the economy and the worsening of socioeconomic inequalities.
In technical terms, the first crisis of this phase lasted eight months, from March to November 2001. It was partially silenced by the terrorist attacks of September 11, but it represents an indication of the exhaustion of the accumulation pattern of neoliberal globalization.
The second crisis of this period was, up to that point, the largest since the Great Depression and is known as the Great Recession. It began in December 2007 and lasted until June 2009, lasting eighteen months. The ” subprime mortgage crisis ,” which had global consequences, is credited as the triggering factor. Although the crisis originated within the financial sector, it received massive bailout packages from both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, setting a precedent.
The real economy is shrinking in value relative to the financial economy, and the US economy’s dependence on external sources of capital is driven by the privileged status it still holds due to the central role of the US dollar in the international monetary and financial system, a status further strengthened by its continued status as the world’s leading financial center.
The formation of speculative bubbles centered on different segments of the capital market and the increased burden of external financing received by the US economy during these years are closely related. There are no domestic sources of financing for speculative bubbles, due to large fiscal deficits and the very low or almost nonexistent level of savings among the population. This can only be explained by the contribution of external capital flows.
The economic crisis that began in late 2019, although noticeable due to the economic slowdown linked to the control of the COVID-19 epidemic in February 2020, is the result of pre-existing problems, contradictions, and imbalances that worsened during the expansionary phase of the cycle, due to the conservative nationalist policies of former President Donald Trump. The debt has reached astronomical levels, given the administration’s emphasis on encouraging economic growth at all costs and speeding up the exit from the crisis before the November 2020 elections.
Such an extraordinary expansionary monetary and fiscal policy has undoubtedly been stimulated by the so-called electoral political cycle (Alesina and Sachs, 1988). The link between politically driven expansionary monetary and fiscal policy is very clear in this case and is well recognized in the literature. It depends on the president’s perceived vulnerability to the economy and other factors (Schultz, 1995). For this reason, former President Trump and analysts and experts closest to the US government labeled it the pandemic crisis.
The relationship between the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic crisis affecting the United States cannot be denied. Nor can the pre-existing causes of the current economic crisis, which are exacerbating the subsequent recovery, be ignored. Although there is no consensus among specialists, the enormous federal deficits and debt could have consequences that accelerate the decline of the power of the United States economy and the deterioration of the dollar’s privileged position.
In short, it can be said that this economic crisis was triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the crisis would erupt anyway; it was expected that year—or a little later—due to the average expansionary phase (2019 marked ten years of expansion).
Success in controlling, confronting, and managing the epidemic within the domestic context constitutes a first assessment of governments’ ability to recover and confront challenges. Contrary to what some politicians believe, economic recovery could not begin without addressing the epidemic and creating conditions for safe operation under the new circumstances. If the causes of the economic crisis were not the result of the pandemic, then the preexisting problems that led to it must be taken into account: socioeconomic inequalities; job quality; growing debts of households, businesses, and the country; restructuring of industry, services, and their international ties; and economic financialization .
At the socioeconomic level and with political significance, differences between sectors and discriminated groups, such as African Americans, play an important role. These problems are reflected in access to healthcare, education, food, and quality housing, as they create instability and social conflict.
The trend of foreign policy and economic policy inspired by the populist and conservative slogan of America First was fulfilled according to the Trumpist interpretation, but it aggravated the existing contradictions with the indiscriminate use of economic instruments for geopolitical purposes, economic, commercial and technological wars, which included not only declared adversaries, but which are great powers such as China and Russia, but also partially damaged relations with allies and partners in America, Asia and Europe.
Biden’s traumatic arrival to the United States presidency had to confront all the difficult economic conditions, exacerbated by the excessive use of economic instruments for coercive purposes: blockades, asset theft, and economic and technological warfare with the world’s second-largest economy. In practice, the Democratic President continued these policies and even deepened their policies of force at the economic and military levels.
This could accelerate the decline of the United States’ economic power and the rise of alternative economic, financial, and monetary alliances. This won’t happen immediately, in the short term, but the process is already underway, and the preliminary results observed are not favorable. The international balance of forces, unfavorable to the United States, is accelerating. The enormous sums of money injected into the economy to alleviate the crisis have fulfilled their expansionist objective, but they do not provide long-term solutions; instead, they exacerbate macroeconomic imbalances and greatly increase the debt burden. The economic crises of the 21st century – particularly the one that began in 2019 and 2020 – mark a stage of exhaustion of the accumulation pattern of neoliberal globalization, a rise in the use of economic instruments of power with a neoconservative geoeconomic inclination for geopolitical purposes, which in any scenario will have consequences in the coming years for the reconfiguration of the international economic and political order depending on the results of the ongoing wars in Ukraine, the Middle East and the growing threat of a war conflict with China over the province of Taiwan.
Throughout its history, the United States has been a leading player in the unfolding of war events and in the articulation of situations that have endangered, and still do, world peace. If we consider the matter in light of the current century and from the logical relationship between possibility and reality established by dialectical philosophy, it is clear that a better world is possible. But in the meantime, a worse world is real. War constitutes a functional element in the mechanism of reproduction of imperialist hegemony and domination, especially in contexts of restructuring of the world order, in which the United States attempts to ignore or break the rules of the current system.
From a historical perspective, following the formation of the United States as a nation, in the midst of the process of capitalist consolidation and expansion, and continuing to the present day, the impact of its foreign policy and the accompanying symbolism, embodied in values, traditions, and ideological constructs, have conditioned and even determined the course of many world affairs. This has led—to use Joseph Nye’s familiar distinctions—to the application of both hard and soft power methods, along with the occasional combination of both through so-called smart power. These three terms designate subversive, mutually complementary modalities oriented toward regime change in countries whose governments are considered adversaries of imperialism or obstacles to its global domination. Their use has become common practice in efforts to accommodate the restructuring world order to their interests and needs.
Beyond such concepts and practices, which were novel at the time and remain present in strategic and academic language, the truth is that the United States has never renounced war, in its most universal sense, whether direct or indirect. That is, understood, following the classic definition of Clausewitz, which Lenin adopted, as the continuation of politics by violent means. This is the type of war that US imperialism carried out, for example, against Korea in the 1950s, against Vietnam in the 1960s, and the one it materialized in the military invasions, just over twenty years ago, of Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003. It is the variant of war it promotes, from the shadows, without involving its troops, in which Ukraine is the protagonist against Russia, and Israel against Palestinian territories, in both cases avoiding compromising its image and responsibility as a historical and political leader. It is the kind of war that knows no geographical, legal, or moral boundaries, that violates basic human rights, that resorts to ethnocide and genocide.
Throughout its history, the United States has been a leading player in the unfolding of war events and in the articulation of situations that have endangered, and still do, world peace. If we consider the matter in light of the current century and from the logical relationship between possibility and reality established by dialectical philosophy, it is clear that a better world is possible. But in the meantime, a worse world is real.
The structuring of various international orders, the readjustments and directions of world politics between agreements, alliances, confrontations, conflicts, war episodes, negotiations, and treaties, beginning in the 19th century and with greater emphasis throughout the 20th century, are examples of the growing and fundamental role of the United States, whose renewed role extends into the first decades of the 21st century. The effects of the so-called end of the Cold War and the 2001 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagonal facilities of the Department of Defense in Washington frame an era of historical transition, variously described. It reveals a world of political unipolarity, economic multi-polarization, the predominance of the American model on a universal scale, and the configuration of global capitalism. The United States is in decline, with economic problems and various crises, but still thriving, with strengths in military, cultural, and media power, with economic difficulties, and in geopolitical dispute with other powers, such as China and Russia. An international system still marked by globalization and neoliberalism stands out, amidst contradictions and readjustments, in which intolerance is gaining ground alongside various manifestations of reactionary extremism, the radical right, and fascism.
In this context, US foreign policy today continues to promote instability by fostering hybrid forms of unconventional warfare without abandoning old formats, employing military actions in line with the imperialist nature of the system that generates and sustains forms of institutionalized brutal violence. While it has adapted to the changing landscape of global dynamics, promoting its permanent interests of domination and circumstantial purposes, this policy reproduces its founding foundations, those that shape the nation’s ideology and cultural identity, the implementation of which does not correspond, as is known, with that idealistic imaginary that seeks to enshrine as universal values such as democracy and freedom, in the American tradition. The separation between words and deeds, between the discourse that enunciates policy and its actual course, between rhetoric and reality, is an indelible mark that characterizes the United States’ activities, both within and outside its borders.
Fascist burning of Odessa Trade Union Hall, May 2, 2014. At least 38 people were killed.
Perhaps the most vivid example that comes to mind is the war in Ukraine. Especially given the difficulty of finding the truth in today’s world, where fake news, distortions, and biased information, manipulated by digital social media, traditional media, and political discourse, abound.
The most common presentation of the problem is that the armed conflict taking place in the heart of Eastern Europe is a war between Russia and Ukraine. It is defined as a product of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, associated with the imperial ambitions of the former (Putin’s) country and nostalgia for the former empire of the tsars and the USSR. Thus, by supporting the Ukrainian government militarily and financially, the United States, with the backing of NATO, acts as representatives of the “free world” and justice in the current “world order.” This is not the case. Another widespread perspective considers this conflict as a war between the forces of socialism and capitalism, or between the right and the left on the international level. That is, as an expression of the existing contradictions between the “socialist camp” and the “imperialist camp.” This is also not the case.
If one pays attention to the history of American foreign policy and the logic that has characterized it, this war reveals itself as an imperialist war, involving the United States, which, as on so many previous occasions, appeals to NATO, directed against Russia on Ukrainian soil, protected by geopolitical concepts and aspirations. Ultimately, it is an expression of the existing contradictions between great powers, shattering illusions that such counterpoints can be reconciled or overcome through diplomatic agreements. Russia is not an imperialist power, but it is a great power, and it possesses a vocation for global presence and power. Looking at its history, culture, and significance for universal progress, this is clearly understandable. Its role in the defeat of fascism and the conquest of space would suffice to illustrate the above.
It is useful to discern between the husk and the grain in analyses, especially when it comes to wars with global implications. War has shown in the past its monstrous potential to persist, spread, and become entangled within peace, becoming intertwined with it. This has been a long-standing trend, reaffirmed since the beginning of this century, when the United States declared the so-called Global War on Terrorism following the aforementioned terrorist attacks in 2001. In essence, imperialist war is not limited solely to periods of armed confrontations, similar to those that have been called global, of devastating material or physical magnitude, of irreparable destruction of natural resources, buildings, and ecological environments, mass extermination, and the danger of species extinction, including humans in the first place. From this perspective, one can reflect on this, affirming, with realism and sorrow, that war is no longer war, in the sense in which the term has usually been used. And that peace is not peace either, in terms of durability. As long as imperialism exists and its repercussions transcend it, once it is transformed or disappears, it is difficult to imagine speaking, in an absolute sense, about the end of war and an era of lasting peace. War today is not only the continuation of politics by other means, but also, and preponderantly, of the market.
Finally, the enormous size of the United States federal debt should not be overlooked as a widely debated issue due to its potential consequences for accelerating the loss of confidence in the US dollar and its eventual loss of the primary currency in the global economy. However, despite this, the dollar still retains preeminence in all functions of the international economy, especially as it is the largest, most dynamic, and reliable financial market in the world.
Amid the upheavals of the current global system, China’s perspective in the international economy and global geopolitics, while not without challenges, offers the best prospects, as it continues to lead the way for internal transformations based on a new pattern of accumulation grounded in technological advances for the benefit of its people; and external transformations favoring an open multilateralism not subordinated to a hegemonic political and ideological stance, but based on shared principles of respect for the sovereignty and independence of states.
Gradually, the US dollar’s participation in the various monetary functions of the global economy has decreased, and steps are being taken in the search for alternative systems by countries such as Russia, China, and the BRICS countries. However, its presence is still predominant. While the so-called de-dollarization could occur in the long-term future, according to the most recent data, the dollar’s current participation in the international economy remains dominant. The current United States policy of using the dollar as an instrument of power or an economic weapon against other major economies accelerates the search for alternative systems as part of the ongoing transformation of the global economic and political system. However, taking into account the initial conditions, the complexity of this process, and the multiple factors and conditions involved, it does not yet appear that a change of such magnitude will be achieved in the short term, displacing the dollar from its global dominance in all monetary functions, while simultaneously consolidating an alternative monetary and financial system.
The world order, in the midst of restructuring, is in a long-term systemic crisis, adjusted to a modality that serves to subordinate the political and social order to the logic of the market and the dynamics of imperialist economic reasoning. Within this framework, the intensification of internal economic contradictions in the current stage of imperialism is noted, along with changes in the international balance of forces and the relative decline of the United States’ economic hegemony, in the face of the rise of other powers, led by China, that do not submit to, nor seek to disengage from the system of imperialist domination. An unfinished global reconfiguration.
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